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Abstract
Two misuses of one-time pad in improving the efficiency of quantum communication
are pointed out. One happens when using some message bits to encrypt others, the
other exists because the key bits are not truly random. Both of them result in the
decrease of security. Therefore, one-time pad should be used carefully in designing
quantum communication protocols.
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The aim of cryptography is to ensure that a secret message is transmitted
between two users in a way that any eavesdropper cannot read it. In classical
cryptography, it is generally accepted that one-time pad [1], which utilizes a
previously shared secret key to encrypt the message transmitted in the public
channel, is the only proved secure cryptosystem [2]. However, it is difficult
for all existing classical cryptosystems to establish a random key with un-
conditional security between the users. Fortunately, quantum key distribution
(QKD) [3,4,5,6], the approach using quantum mechanics principles for the dis-
tribution of secret key, can overcome this obstacle skillfully. Since both QKD
and one-time pad have proved security [7,8,9,10], the cryptosystem of “QKD
& one-time pad” is a perfect one when the security is concerned.
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Quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) [11,12,13,14] is another branch
of quantum cryptography. Different from QKD, QSDC allows the sender trans-
mits directly the secret (not a random key) to the receiver in a deterministic
and secure manner. If it is designed carefully, a QSDC protocol can also attain
unconditional security [15].
With the fast development of quantum cryptography, more and more novel
QKD and QSDC protocols were proposed. An important criterion of a protocol
is its efficiency. In the work of scheme designing, a higher efficiency is the goal
the scheme-designers always pursue. However, the feasibility of some ways
that lead to high efficiency should be reexamined. In this Letter we choose
two typical protocols to discuss, where the alleged high efficiency is illusory.
That is, such an unrealistic efficiency would result in insecurity.
Recently, a semi-direct quantum secure communication protocol was presented
in Ref. [16]. In this protocol, three users Alice, Bob, and Charlie can exchange
one bit of message securely by using one GHZ-state. That is, each of them can
send one bit of message to the other two person while the outside eavesdrop-
per, say Eve, can never obtain any information about these bits. Setting aside
the particular process of this part of protocol, we only discuss its way used
to improve the efficiency. In the following discussion, we assume that the bits
transmitted by quantum process are unconditionally secure. As we can see, the
efficiency of the quantum process is one bit per GHZ-state. To make it more
efficient, the users employ the quantum process to send the odd-numbered se-
cret bits but a classical one to send the even-numbered bits, namely, using the
odd-numbered bits to encrypt the even-numbered ones. For example, suppose
Alice’s secret bit string is {a1, a2, a3, ..., aN}. Alice first sends a1 to Bob and
Charlie by quantum process. Afterwards, Alice calculates a
′
1 = a1 ⊕ a2 (⊕ de-
notes the addition modulo 2) and publicly broadcasts a
′
1. With the knowledge
of a1, Bob and Charlie can deduce a2 just by a2 = a
′
1 ⊕ a1. On the contrary,
as an outside eavesdropper, Eve cannot obtain any information about a2 since
she does not know a1. Similarly, Alice sends a3 by quantum process and a4
by classical one, and so on. As the author of Ref. [16] pointed out, each of
the odd-numbered secret bits “is used only once in the encoding so their con-
fidentiality has not been leaked out at all, in accordance with the one-time
pad.” By this way, the efficiency of whole protocol is doubled to 2 bits per
GHZ-state.
Indeed, the above process to send the even-numbered secret bits looks like
that of one-time pad. However, it is really not so. Consider the scenario
where Alice and Bob share two secure key bits {k1, k2} and Alice wants to
send two confidential bits {p1, p2} to Bob. In a real one-time pad, Alice en-
crypts the plaintext {p1, p2} with the key bits {k1, k2}, obtaining the ciphertext
{c1, c2} = {p1 ⊕ k1, p2 ⊕ k2}. Afterwards, Alice sends {c1, c2} to Bob publicly.
With the knowledge of {k1, k2}, Bob can obtain the plaintext by the decryp-
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tion {p1, p2} = {c1 ⊕ k1, c2 ⊕ k2}. On the contrary, Eve cannot extract any
information about the plaintext from {c1, c2}. As a result, Alice can transmit
2 bits to Bob securely by the above process. Differently, in Ref. [16], Alice
uses the first message bit a1 instead of a key bit to encrypt the second one
a2 and broadcasts the ciphertext a
′
1, which results in an invalid transmission
from the perspective of information theory and cryptography. That is, Eve can
attain some information about the message bits {a1, a2} from the declared a′1.
For example, a
′
1 = 0. Then Eve knows either {a1, a2} = 00 or {a1, a2} = 11,
which contains only log2 2 = 1 bit of information for her. When a
′
1 = 1 we will
draw the similar conclusion. Therefore, from the declared a
′
1 Eve can obtain 1
bit of information about the two message bits though she does not know the
particular value of them. Consequently, every time Alice sends two message
bits according to the protocol in Ref. [16], Bob obtains all the 2 bits of infor-
mation while Eve can also get 1. Namely, in essence, Alice just transmits 1 bit
of information to Bob securely. From this point of view, the way to improve
efficiency in Ref. [16] is null.
Things do not come singly but in pairs. Not long ago, Li et al. presented
a QKD scheme [17] based on entanglement swapping [18]. In this protocol,
Alice and Bob previously shared enough EPR pairs in known states. With-
out loss of generality, consider two pairs |Φ+〉12
AB
= 1/
√
2(|00〉 + |11〉) and
|Ψ+〉34AB = 1/
√
2(|01〉+ |10〉), where the superscripts 1, 2, 3, 4 denote the dif-
ferent particles. Alice holds particles 1, 3 and Bob controls 2, 4. When they
distribute key bits, Alice and Bob perform entanglement swapping between
these two EPR pairs. According to the rule of entanglement swapping, each
of them knows not only his/her measurement result but also his/her counter-
part’s. The author of Ref. [17] alleged that these two results can bring four
key bits to Alice and Bob. For example, when Alice performs a Bell mea-
surement on particles 1 and 3 she gets |Ψ+〉13
AA
, she can deduce that Bob’s
measurement outcome must be |Φ+〉24BB. If four EPR states |Φ+〉, |Φ−〉, |Ψ+〉,
and |Ψ−〉 represent 00, 01, 10, and 11 respectively, Alice will obtain four key
bits 1000, where 10 comes from |Ψ+〉13
AA
and 00 corresponds to |Φ+〉24
BB
. At the
same time, Bob can attain these four key bits by similar deduction. Therefore,
four particles bring four key bits, which means a double efficiency of that in
BB84 protocol [3].
However, the efficiency may not be so high. As we know, for two given EPR
pairs, the two measurement results in entanglement swapping are not com-
pletely random. On the contrary, they have strong correlation. Consider the
above example again, because
|Φ+〉12
AB
|Ψ+〉34
AB
=
1
2
{|Φ+〉13
AB
|Ψ+〉24
AB
+ |Φ−〉13
AB
|Ψ−〉24
AB
+|Ψ+〉13AB|Φ+〉24AB + |Ψ−〉13AB|Φ−〉24AB} (1)
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anyone, including Eve, who knows the initial state |Φ+〉12
AB
|Ψ+〉34
AB
can draw a
conclusion that Alice and Bob’s outcome pair must be one of {|Φ+〉13
AB
|Ψ+〉24
AB
,
|Φ−〉13AB|Ψ−〉24AB, |Ψ+〉13AB|Φ+〉24AB, |Ψ−〉13AB|Φ−〉24AB} randomly. Therefore, Eve knows
the key bits Alice and Bob obtain should be one of {0010, 0111, 1000, 1101}
with equal probability while other twelve results (such as 0000, 0100, etc)
never appear, which contains only I = −∑4
i=1
1
4
log 1
4
= 2 bits of information.
As a result, if Alice encrypts her secret by using above results as four key
bits of one-time pad, it would be leaked partly to Eve when the ciphertext
is transmitted publicly. For example, let {p1, p2, p3, p4} and {k1, k2, k3, k4} de-
note four bits of plaintext and key respectively. Then the ciphertext equals
{c1, c2, c3, c4} = {p1 ⊕ k1, p2 ⊕ k2, p3 ⊕ k3, p4 ⊕ k4}. Observing the possible
values of the above key bits, we can see that k1 ⊕ k3 = 1 and k2 ⊕ k4 = 0 al-
ways hold. Sequently, when the cipertext is announced, Eve always know that
p1⊕p3 = c1⊕k1⊕c3⊕k3 = c1⊕c3⊕1, and p2⊕p4 = c2⊕k2⊕c4⊕k4 = c2⊕c4,
which implies a two-bit leakage of the secret. In a word, to attain security, the
efficiency of the protocol in Ref. [17] should be 2 bits per entanglement swap-
ping, but not the alleged 4.
Both the above errors are related to the right understanding of one-time pad.
It was shown, by Shannon [2], that the one-time pad which meets the follow-
ing three conditions is perfectly secure: (i) the key is truly random, (ii) the
key has the same length as the message, (iii) the key is never reused. In Ref.
[16], the user use a message bit, but not a key bit, to encrypt another one. In
Ref. [17], the key bits are correlated but not truly random. Neither of them
is a real one-time pad. Therefore, we should know not only one-time pad can
achieve perfect security but also the requirements to possess this merit. We
emphasize that unconditional security is a crucial feature of quantum cryp-
tography (generally QKD & one-time pad) and it should never be sacrificed
to improve the performance of other aspects such as efficiency.
As we analyzed above, fake one-time pad cannot be used to improve the
efficiency of a quantum communication protocol. In fact the efficiency was
bounded by Holeve quantity [19], which implies that n qubits cannot be used
to transmit more than n bits of classical information. So, 1 key bit per qubit is
already the full efficiency. In a 2-level system it equals 1 bit per particle (here
we do not discuss d-level quantum system [20,21,22], which can certainly reach
higher efficiency than a 2-level one). For example, with the qubit storage facil-
ity, the delayed-choice BB84 protocol [23] can achieve full efficiency in theory.
From this point of view, the alleged high efficiencies in both Ref. [16] and [17]
are illusory because they are even exceed a maximal value which is allowed by
quantum mechanics.
In summary, we point out two misuses of one-time pad in improving the effi-
ciency of quantum communication [16,17]. Indeed, one-time pad can accom-
plish perfect security. But we should always remember its necessary conditions
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when we utilize it in quantum cryptography. Otherwise, the quantum protocol
may become insecure.
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